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ABSTRACT
Reducing corruption has been one major challenge facing gov-
ernment and policy makers in Nigeria. This study employs the
ARDL, CCR and FMOLS methods to assess the determinants of
corruption in Nigeria over the period 1984–2016. The result of the
cointegration test indicates that corruption and its determinants
(economic development, political rights, military expenditure,
rents, civil liberties and openness) have a long-run relationship.
The results of the ARDL, CCR and FMOLS estimation demonstrate
that economic development, political rights, military expenditure,
rents, civil liberties and openness, are the main determinants of
corruption in the long-run. Higher-economic development,
greater civil liberties, more openness and higher military expend-
iture are related to lower corruption, but higher rents and polit-
ical rights are associated with higher corruption. Based on these
outcomes, this study recommends policies to promote economic
development, civil liberties, political rights and openness, includ-
ing reducing the reliance on the oil sector to curb corruption
in Nigeria.
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1. Introduction
Although nations across the globe face numerous challenges, corruption has been
identified as a major problem both developed and developing countries continue to
contend with. Corruption scandals have surfaced in countries with different political
systems and varying levels of income (Ades & Di Tella, 1997). Evidences of corrup-
tion, however, abound in developing countries and transition nations (Aidt, 2003). In
addition, it has been established that corruption is not only widespread in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, the economies and citizens of the region are the
worst hit by corruption (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Gyimah-Brempong & de
Camacho, 2006).
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There are two opposing views on the role corruption plays on the economy of a
country. The first group argued that corruption tends to slowdown economic growth
via reduction in human capital development in the form less spending on education
and healthcare, misallocation of resources, inadequate domestic investment, less pro-
visions of social amenities and transfers to the poor, and high inequality and poverty,
among other things (see Abu, karim & Aziz, 2015a; Del Monte, & Papagni, 2007;
Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Gyimah-
Brempong & de Camacho, 2006; Habib & Zurawicki, 2001; Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001;
Nguyen & van Dijk, 2012; Wei, 2000). On the other hand, a few researchers including
Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) opined that corruption promotes economic
growth by increasing efficiency in countries where bureaucrats/government officials
are inefficient and constitute barriers to investment growth. Thus, by bribing govern-
ment or public officials, businessmen/investors spend less time in queue to obtain
business permits and licences, including contract approvals. This leads to an increase
in efficiency of the system, causing investment and production of goods and services
to rise and consequently boosting economic growth.
There is no consensus among economists on the precise or comprehensive defin-
ition of corruption (Aidt, 2003). The meaning of corruption differs from one place to
the other, and what is considered as corruption in a particular society might be
viewed as the norm in another (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). For example,
Transparency International sees corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for pri-
vate gain. On his part, Jain (2001) considered corruption as the use of the power of
public office for personal gain in such a manner that contravenes the rules of the
game. In addition, Jain (2001) categorised corruption into three namely – grand cor-
ruption which involves political elite, bureaucratic corruption which involves bureau-
crats, and legislative corruption which involves how a legislator’s private interest
influences legislative votes. These forms of corruption vary only in terms of the indi-
vidual who engages in it. The consequence of any of this type of corruption is the
same, and that is the misallocation of resources and reducing efficiency of the system
(Gyimah-Brempong, 2002).
Nigeria like many developing countries has continued to face many social and eco-
nomic problems. These include poor public spending on education and healthcare,
high unemployment, low incomes and high level of poverty, rising insecurity, kidnap-
ping, cattle rustling, and cultism, to mention just a few. A major factor that has been
blamed for the poor standards of living in Nigeria is the massive corruption in the
public sector. For instance, Abu (2015) submitted that corruption is deep-rooted in
almost every segment/section of the Nigerian economy including the various arms of
government (that is, executive, legislature and judiciary). The ruling All Progressive
Congress (APC) won the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections on the promise that it
will tackle corruption head-on, fight insecurity as well as developing the economy. In
addition, the President (Muhammadu Buhari) has repeatedly said that ‘if Nigerians
don’t kill corruption, corruption will kill Nigeria’. It is not surprising therefore, that
the government is investigating alleged embezzlement of over $2billion that was
meant to prosecute the war against insurgency and Boko-Haram by cabinet members
and high-ranking government officials including political associates of the previous
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administration, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). To this end, the former
National Security Adviser (NSA) and Spokesperson of the PDP were apprehended
and are currently standing trial. Similarly, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN)
was suspended and he is been prosecuted for failing to declare his assets (properties
and cash running into millions of dollars). Recently, the government anti-corruption
fight paid-off as two former state Governors were convicted and sentenced to four-
teen years in prison, respectively, on account of defrauding and/or embezzling funds
belonging to their states.
In addition, the private sector which was believed to be less corrupt has been
found culpable, as certain firms were allegedly used to siphoned or launder stolen
monies by government officials. In line with this, some banks’ executives have been
arraigned while others have been convicted. Similarly, foreign firms operating in
Nigeria such as Halliburton and Sagem have been fingered in corruption related cases
in the past. Moreover, the various reports of reputable international organisations
such as the Transparency International (TI), Political Risk Service Group (PRS) and
the World Bank (WB) have suggested that corruption thrives in Nigeria, with public
officials using their power of office for private gain. In particular, the TI corruption
perception index and ranking, the PRS International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) cor-
ruption index and the WB control of corruption indicator over the years show that
Nigeria is one of the most corrupt nations in the world.
Despite its negative consequences, economists are yet to properly understand the
steps that should be taken to reduce corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1997).
Furthermore, whereas researchers have established that corruption influences certain
macroeconomic variables which include trade, underdevelopment, savings, invest-
ment, and growth, they have paid less attention to corruption determinants until
recently (for example see Ali & Isee, 2003; Swaleheen, 2008; Zhang, Cao, & Vaughn,
2009). Moreover, most studies that were conducted to ascertain the determinants of
corruption focused on a group of countries, employing either cross-section or panel
data (see Ades & Di Tella, 1997; Ali & Isee, 2003; Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012;
Evrensel, 2010; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Goel & Nelson, 2005; Iwasaki & Suzuki, 2012;
Park, 2003; Serra, 2006; Triesman, 2000, 2007; Zhang et al., 2009).
Additionally, empirical research on the determinants of corruption at individual
country level is very scanty. Interestingly, Nguyen and van Dijk (2012) advocated for
country-specific studies on corruption, because it can aid our understanding on why
and how corruption affects the economy, and therefore provide policy prescription to
governments to remedy the situation. In the same vein, Ali and Isee (2003) opined
that once the main drivers of corruption have been established, appropriate policy
conclusions can be drawn from an empirical exercise, leading to the design and
implementation of policies to checking and/or reducing the harmful impacts of cor-
ruption. Furthermore, Athukorala and Sen (2004) argued that cross sectional studies
are based on highly restrictive assumptions, and any results from them might not be
acceptable by all. Therefore, they emphasised the need for studies that are coun-
try-specific.
Despite the high level of corruption in Nigeria, little has been done to empirically
examine the determinants of corruption. Although the recent study by Akinpelu,
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Ogunseye, Bada, and Agbeyangi (2013) on the determinants of corruption in Nigeria
deserves some commendations, however, the study has certain weaknesses. In particu-
lar, the authors employed the Johansen’s cointegration approach even though the var-
iables used in their analysis had a mixture of I(0) and I(1). In addition, the authors
employed a small sample size. We believed that an appropriate estimation technique
should be the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) method. Also, it is a known
fact that using time series data for estimation purpose can lead to problems such as
serial-correlation and heteroscedasticity. But Akinpelu et al. (2013) did not conduct
any of these diagnostic tests making one to doubt the reliability of the reported
results. Moreover, factors such as political rights and civil liberties that have been
found to be important determinants of corruption in the literature were left out by
Akinpelu et al. (2013).
The present study is important and contributes to the existing literature for a
number of reasons. First, this study employs different methods of analysis namely the
ARDL, Canonical Cointegration Regression (CCR) and Fully Modified Ordinary
Least Squares (FMOLS) to examine the determinants of corruption in Nigeria from
1984 to 2016. These methods have several advantages over the conventional cointe-
gration technique used by Akinpelu et al. (2013). These advantages are discussed in
the econometric techniques section of this study. In addition, by using several estima-
tion techniques (i.e., ARDL, CCR and FMOLS), we can ascertain the consistency and
robustness of the results. Second, this study performs diagnostic tests including serial-
correlation and heteroscedasticity, which Akinpelu et al. (2013) failed to conduct to
check the reliability of the results generated. Third, this study is the first to explore
the role of political rights and civil liberties on corruption in Nigeria. Fourth, once
the main factors that are responsible for high corruption in Nigeria have been estab-
lished, then we can suggest appropriate policies to reduce corruption in Nigeria.
The objective of this study is to examine the determinants of corruption in
Nigeria. Following the introduction, section two is the theoretical and empirical lit-
erature review. The third section consists of the model formulation and the data.
Section four is the econometric techniques while results and discussion are taken up
in the fifth section. The sixth section is for conclusion.
2. Literature review
2.1. Theoretical literature
There is no comprehensive theory that explains the linkage between corruption and
its potential determinants. This makes it a bit difficult to come up with a theoretical
model or employ an empirical method that is agreed to all researchers in examining
the factors that affect corruption (Alt & Lassen, 2003; Goel & Nelson, 2011).
Nevertheless, researchers have relied on a few theories when attempting to investigate
the determinants of corruption. One of the theories is the tax compliance theory
(Mookherjee & Png, 1989; Reinganum & Wilde, 1985). The theory proposes that one
way to reduce corruption is through appropriate levels of auditing. Another theory
that has been employed is the compensation theory (Becker & Stigler, 1974). The the-
ory argues that payment of wages/salaries above the market clearing wages/salaries
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including monitoring the activities of the agents (government officials) from time to
time can help to control corruption. There is also the social support theory (Cullen,
1994) which has its root in Lin’s (1986) theory of mental illness and Braithwaite’s
(1989) theory of shaming and reintegration. The theory suggests that high levels of
social support raise citizens’ wellbeing and as a result lower crime rates (corruption)
in a society.
In addition, two other approaches to checking or controlling corruption which
have been proposed in the literature are the lawyer’s approach of Italy’s Judge,
Antonio Di Pietro (1994), and the economist’s approach of Rose-Ackerman (1978),
Ades and Di Tella (1997) and Bliss and Di Tella (1997). The lawyer’s approach advo-
cates the enactment of stronger new laws including greater enforcement of existing
laws to check corruption. It also argues that the judiciary should be given the power
to grant immunity from prosecution offenders who cooperate during investigations.
Last, the economist’s approach believes that corruption can be curbed via promotion
of competition among firms and/or government officials.
Furthermore, the literature of criminal activity determinants (Becker, 1968) has
been emphasised by authors such as Billger and Goel (2009) and Goel and Nelson
(2010). Becker (1968) suggested that individuals who give and take bribes weigh the
benefits and costs of participating in criminal (or corrupt) activities. Examples of the
benefits of engaging in corrupt acts include the favours that monopolist-bureaucrats
can give as well as reducing red tape (Guriev, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). On the
other hand, some of the costs of corruption include arrest and punishment of corrupt
individuals (Billger & Goel, 2009). Although, saddled with the responsibility of moni-
toring the activities of bureaucrats, anti-corruption agencies can also be corrupt
(Banerjee, 1997).
Recently, scholars have also borrowed the ideas of the dynamic economic inter-
action model of social tolerance among groups proposed by Cerqueti, Correani, and
Garofalo (2013) to suggest ways corruption can be tackled (see Shi & Pan, 2018; Shi,
Pan, & Peng, 2017). In explaining the social tolerance theory, Shi and Pan (2018)
opined that in an attempt to get integrated and be tolerated by the society, corrupt
government officials must distribute aggregate wealth in a manner that the larger pro-
portion/share of the wealth goes to the ordinary members of the society compared to
the value that corrupt government officials receive. They further advised that corrup-
tion can be reduced via reforming economic and political institutions.
2.2. Empirical literature
Several efforts have been made to examine the major determinants of corruption. A
considerable number of the studies focused on a group of countries, and employed
either cross-section or panel data in their analysis. In essence, studies focusing on
corruption determinants at individual country level are not many. For instance,
Kolstad and Wiig (2015) analysed the effect of democracy on corruption in a cross-
country study during the 1946–2008 period, using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
and Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques. The results confirm that democracy
reduces corruption. Other factors that reduce corruption include income level
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(captured by log of GDP per capita), democracy duration and democracy in conflict.
In addition, Busse and Gr€oning (2013) employed the two-step system-Generalized
Method of Moments (system-GMM) estimator to analyse the relationship between
governance and natural resource in 129 countries from 1984 to 2007. The results sug-
gest that exports of natural resources promote corruption, while income level has a
negative relationship with corruption.
Moreover, Elbahnasawy and Revier (2012) examined corruption determinants in
150 countries over the 1998-2005 period using the Hausman and Taylor’s technique
to estimate a random effects model that incorporates both the effects of corruption
determinants that vary over time and those that are time-invariant. The results dem-
onstrate that greater law enforcement and high-income level reduce corruption.
Similarly, greater freedom of expression and accountability do have a negative and
significant effect on corruption. On the other hand, corruption is not significantly
affected by factors which include ethnic fractionalisation, natural resource abundance,
dominant religious tradition, population size and political stability.
Furthermore, Kotera, Okada, and Samreth (2012) examined the effect of govern-
ment size and democracy on corruption across countries using OLS, IV and GMM
estimators. The results suggest that income level, government size and democracy
including government size-democracy interaction are negatively related to corruption.
On their part, Iwasaki and Suzuki (2012) employed random effects and fixed effects
models to examine the determinants of corruption in transition economies using
panel data covering the 1996–2006 period. The authors found that progress in the
rule of law, democratisation and marketisation are effective ways to control corrup-
tion. Similarly, Nur-Tegin and Czap (2012) used the Leamer’s Extreme Bounds
Analysis and OLS with White-corrected robust standard errors to analyse the linkage
between corruption and democracy, autocracy and political stability, across countries
over the 2000–2009 period. The results reveal that corruption is less in unstable
democracies compared to stable autocracies. In addition, income per capita has a
positive effect on the corruption index.
Also, Arezki and Bruckner (2011) investigated the impact of oil rents on corrup-
tion and state stability in a sample of 30 oil exporting nations using the least squares
and system-GMM estimators over the 1992–2005 period. The authors found that an
increase in oil rents has a positive and significant effect on corruption. Furthermore,
oil rents do have a negative and significant impact on political rights, but a positive
and significant relationship with civil liberties. Moreover, Goel and Nelson (2011)
evaluated corruption determinants in states in the U.S. using various estimation tech-
niques. The results indicate that higher judicial employment encourages corruption.
Besides, Southern states appear to be more corrupt, but higher Protestant population
as well as corrections employment are not significant in influencing corruption.
Geographically, Southern states were found to be more corrupt. In addition, Evrensel
(2010) examined corruption determinants in a sample consisting of 154 developed
and developing countries, using cross-section OLS to analyse data that were
1998–2000 averages. The empirical results confirm that countries with slow economic
growth, high-inflation rates, totalitarian political regimes, ineffective judicial systems
and low levels of education, have high levels of corruption.
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Moreover, Goel and Nelson (2010) investigated the corruption effect of history,
geography and government in a sample of almost 100 countries. The results of esti-
mation reveal that democracy, income per capita, urbanisation, use of English com-
mon law system, and government size, are associated with lower corruption.
Furthermore, Billger and Goel (2009) assessed the determinants of corruption using
recent cross-sectional data for almost 100 countries. The results of the OLS and quan-
tile regression analyses indicate that greater economic freedom and larger government
size do not reduce corruption significantly in the most corrupt countries. In addition,
greater democracy appears to reduce corruption. Also, Triesman (2007) examined the
causes of corruption in a cross-national study, using the OLS regressions with White-
corrected standard error and IV technique. The author’s findings suggest that more
developed countries, with a free and widely read press, a long history of liberal dem-
ocracy, more openness to trade, and a high proportion of women in government, are
less corrupt. On the other hand, corruption is high in countries that experience
unpredictable inflation, disruptive business regulations, and depend on fuel exports.
In addition, Del Monte and Papagni (2007) evaluated the determinants of corrup-
tion in 20 regions of Italy over the period 1963–2001 using the Two Stage Least
Squares (TSLS) approach. The results reveal that economic variables (i.e., government
consumption and economic development) and political and cultural influences (i.e.,
party concentration, presence of voluntary organisations, and absenteeism at national
elections) are significant determinants of corruption in Italy. Moreover, Serra (2006)
studied the determinants of corruption in 62 developed and developing counties using
the Leamer’s Extreme-Bounds Analysis. The author discovered that corruption level is
less in rich and more democratic countries, including countries that are predominantly
Protestant. On the other hand, corruption is high in politically unstable countries.
Another important determinant of corruption is a country’s colonial heritage.
Furthermore, Glaeser and Saks (2006) employed the OLS and IV methods to assess
the determinants and effects of corruption across states in the U.S. during the
1976–2002 period. The results show that corruption is less in wealthy and more edu-
cated states. In addition, racial fractionalisation and income inequality are important
determinants of corruption, while corruption is not related to government size.
Additionally, Gokcekus and Kn€orich (2006) employed OLS and IV techniques to
examine the effect of the level and quality of openness on corruption in 133 coun-
tries. The results show that both the level and quality of openness have a reducing
impact on the level of corruption. In the same vein, high-income level as well as a
free and open press have a significant effect on corruption. Goel and Nelson (2005)
found that the level of development, democracy and economic freedom do have a
negative and significant effect on corruption in the U.S.
In addition, Gatti (2004) investigated if the existence of obstacles to trade and cap-
ital flows is related to high corruption. The author did not find any clear association
between corruption and openness. Furthermore, Brunetti and Weder (2003) investi-
gated the effect of a free press on corruption in 128 countries over the 1994–1998
period, using OLS and TSLS techniques. The results demonstrate that a higher press
freedom leads to lower corruption. Similarly, Ali and Isee (2003) examined the deter-
minants of corruption in a cross-country study, using the OLS and TSLS. The authors
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found that education (secondary school enrolment), economic freedom, federalism
and the rule of law have a negative and significant on corruption. However, govern-
ment size and foreign aid have a positive and significant effect on the level of corrup-
tion. Furthermore, the coefficient of foreign aid and government expenditure
interaction suggests that the marginal effect of government expenditure on corruption
increases with the level of foreign aid.
Moreover, Fisman and Gatti (2002) employed both OLS and TSLS methods to
examine the effect of decentralisation on corruption in a sample of countries. The
results demonstrate that decentralisation, government size and income per capita
have a negative and significant effect on corruption. But population has a positive
effect on corruption. Also, Triesman (2000) attempted to answer the question ‘why
perceived corruption appears to be higher in some countries than others, using the
business risk surveys for the 1980s and 1990s periods. Employing the OLS and
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimators, the author found that corruption is lower
in more developed countries with high imports, predominantly protestant and a his-
tory of British rule. In addition, longer exposure to democracy tends to lower corrup-
tion, and corruption appears to be high in federal states. In addition, Ades and Di
Tella (1999) employed OLS, TSLS and fixed effects estimators to examine the effect
of rents (fuels and mineral exports) and competition on corruption across countries.
The results show that rents is associated with high corruption, and high competition
(share of trade in GDP) reduces corruption. Furthermore, real-GDP per capita signifi-
cantly reduces corruption.
Similarly, Ades and Di Tella (1997) evaluated the effects of openness and inde-
pendence of the judiciary including their interaction on corruption across countries
using regression analysis. Other variables included in the corruption model are the
level of development of the country (measured by income per capita, GDP), school-
ing, and political competition. The results suggest that corruption is higher in coun-
tries that are closed to foreign competition, and lack independence of the judiciary.
Also, the results demonstrate that corruption tends to be less as a country opens up
to foreign trade especially if it lacks a well-developed judicial system. A summary of
empirical literature is reported in Table 1.
Looking at the existing literature, it is obvious that empirical studies on the deter-
minants of corruption focused mainly on a group of countries, employing cross-sec-
tional and/or panel data. However, country-specific studies on corruption
determinants are relatively scarce. Moreover, the only empirical study on Nigeria by
Akinpelu et al. (2013) employed an inappropriate estimation method, that is, the
Johansen cointegration method to estimate a small sample. In addition, Akinpelu
et al. (2013) failed to conduct important diagnostic tests such as serial-correlation
and heteroscedasticity tests, making us to doubt the reliability of their results.
Moreover, their study left out important variables such as political rights and civil lib-
erties which have been found to affect corruption. Thus, this study contributes to the
existing literature by examining the determinants of corruption in Nigeria, using
three methods of estimation including the ARDL, CCR and FMOLS techniques.
These methods are more appropriate compared to the conventional cointegration
method employed by Akinpelu et al. (2013). Furthermore, this study conducts post
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Table 1. A Summary of empirical literature on the determinants of corruption.
Authors Country/Region Method/Model Findings
Kolstad and Wiig (2015) Cross-country
(1946–2008)
OLS and IV Democracy reduces corruption.
Busse and Gr€oning (2013) 129 countries
(1984–2007)
System-GMM Exports of natural resources
encourage corruption, but
income reduces corruption.
Kotera et al. (2012) 82 countries
(1995–2008)
OLS, IV and GMM Government size, democracy
(average of political rights and
civil liberties), government size
and democracy interaction, and
income level are negatively
related to corruption.





Corruption is less in unstable
democracies compared to
stable autocracies. In addition,
income level is negatively









Greater law enforcement, freedom
of expression and
accountability, high income
have a negative effect
on corruption.




Greater rule of law, democracy
and progress in marketisation
are effective in the
control corruption.




Oil rents do promote corruption,
have a negative effect on
political rights, and positive
impact on civil liberties.
Evrensel (2010) 154 countries
(1998–2000)
Cross-section OLS Corruption is high in countries
with high inflation rates,
totalitarian political regimes,
ineffective judicial systems,
slow economic growth and low
levels of education.




Random effects Income level, democracy
(captured by the sum of
political rights and civil
liberties) and common law are
negatively related to the level
of corruption.




Greater democracy (captured by
the sum of political rights and
civil liberties) reduces the level
of corruption.




High income and greater
democracy (political rights and
civil liberties) reduce





133 countries OLS and IV Openness, free press and income
level have a reducing effect on
the level of corruption.
Ades and Di Tella (1999) Cross-country
(1980–1983,
1989–1990)
OLS, TSLS and fixed
effects
Rents are positively related with
corruption, while income level
and competition
reduce corruption.
Note: OLS¼Ordinary Least Squares; IV¼ Instrument Variables; GMM¼Generalized Method of Moments; and
TSLS¼ Two Stage Least Squares.
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estimation tests including serial-correlation and heteroscedasticity tests to validate the
reliability of the estimated results. Last, the methods were used to ascertain the con-
sistency and robustness of the results that are generated.
3. Model specification and data
To examine the drivers of corruption in Nigeria, this study considers certain variables
which have been cited in the literature as potential factors influencing the level of
corruption in a country.
One of the determinants of corruption (COR) is the level of economic develop-
ment (GDPC) measured by GDP per capita. Theoretically, at high-income level coun-
tries have the financial resources to deploy to fight corruption (Busse & Gr€oning,
2013). For example, if anti-graft agencies are properly funded, it will facilitate detec-
tion, investigation, arrest and prosecution of offenders. In addition, the propensity to
pay and collect bribes is less in wealthy countries because there is more equity in
income distribution (Asongu, 2013; Serra, 2006).
Moreover, rich countries invest more resources in educating their citizens. When
people are well educated, they are more aware of their rights and duties, including
having less desire to engage in corrupt acts (Goel & Nelson, 2010). Some studies have
established that economic development (proxied by GDP per capita) has a negative
and significant effect on corruption (see Goel & Nelson, 2010; Knack & Azfar, 2003;
Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005; Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Serra, 2006;
Triesman, 2000, 2007).
The level of democracy measured by political rights (POL) and/or civil liberties
(CIV) can also affect the level of corruption (Billger & Goel, 2009; Goel & Nelson,
2010; Serra, 2006; Triesman, 2007; Zhang et al., 2009). Political rights enable people
to participate freely in the political process, as well as exercising the right to vote,
competing for public office and electing representatives who enact policies and at the
same time are accountable to the electorate. In the same vein, civil liberties promotes
freedom of expression, rights to association and organisation, including personal
autonomy and application of rule of law. Moreover, democracy aids human develop-
ment and it increases social supports for the wellbeing of the populace (Zhang et al.,
2009). These in turn reduce corruption in a country. On the other hand, corruption
tends to be high in undemocratic nations because checks and balances are inadequate.
On their part, Goel and Nelson (2010) opined that corruption is less in democratic
countries since there is high tendency that corrupt government officials or politicians
might lose their office if they are caught.
In addition, greater democracy encourages political competition, and elected offi-
cials are not only accountable to the electorate but can be punished/sactioned by the
electorate if they do not keep to promises including fighting corruption (Aidt, 2003;
Aidt & Dutta, 2001; Asongu, 2013; Del Monte & Papagni, 2007; Ferejohn, 1986).
Similarly, Kunicova (2006) contended that undemocratic nations can provide grounds
for rent-seeking activities and as a result raise corruption level. Some researchers
have used sum or averages of political rights and civil liberties as a measure of dem-
ocracy in their analysis (for instance, see Billger & Goel, 2009; Goel & Nelson, 2005,
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2010; Kotera et al., 2012). Yet others employed only political rights as a proxy for
democracy (Ades & Di Tella, 1997, 1999). But Arezki and Bruckner (2011) seperated
political rights and civil liberties in their study. Studies have discovered that democ-
racy is negatively and significantly related to the level of corruption (see Billger &
Goel, 2009; Goel & Nelson, 2010; Triesman, 2007). In line with Arezki and Bruckner
(2011), this study looks at the effect of the individual measure of democracy, that is,
POL and CIV, on corruption.
Economic rents (RENT) can influence the magnitude of corruption in a country.
It has been argued that a country’s level of corruption will be high, especially if there
are larger economic rents for government officials to appropriate or capture (Ades &
Di Tella, 1999; Gatti, 2004; Bulte & Damania, 2008; Lane & Tornell, 1996; Leite &
Weidman, 1999; Triesman, 2007). For instance, Ades and Di Tella (1999) hypothes-
ised that if an economy is dependent on natural resources or raw materials (such as
fuels, metals and minerals) and export these resources mainly, it will promote rents
and consequently corruption will be high. Since the exploitation and management of
natural resources is conducted mainly by multinationals and public enterprises, it
provides opportunities for rents-seeking activities and corruption by both foreign
firms and local leaders (Gatti, 2004; Leite & Weidman, 1999; O’Higgins, 2006).
Moreover, proceeds from the sale of these resources are usually not declared and a
greater proportion of it (proceeds) is stolen due to the involvement of many interme-
diaries. Moreso, because the proceeds are foreign currency dominated, the incentives
for stealing and hiding these revenues in secret foreign accounts are high (O’Higgins,
2006). Unfortunately, these activities often go undetected. Prior studies have estab-
lished that rents encourage corruption (see Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Arezki &
Bruckner, 2011; Triesman, 2000).
Military expenditure (MLE) can dictate the movement in the level of corruption.
In Nigeria (and other ECOWAS countries) where military dictators headsway for
many years, they institutionalised corruption (Abu & Karim, 2015; Abu, Karim, &
Aziz, 2015b). The Transparency International (2002) cited in d’Agostino, Dunne, and
Pieroni (2012) submitted that allegations of corruption against the military sector are
expected from time to time due to the relatively low competition in the military sec-
tor. The monopolistic nature of the sector provides the grounds or avenue for secrecy
in the award or approval of contracts, leading to rent-seeking and corruption. The
implications of rent-seeking and corruption include the high cost of conducting mili-
tary services and crowding out of private sector investment, all of which slow down
the growth of the economy. The study by d’Agostino et al. (2012) concluded that
rent-seeking in the military sector promotes corrupt activities, which in turn hinders
the performance of the economy.
Openness to trade (OPEN) measured by total trade (or sum of exports and
imports) to GDP ratio can also influence the level of corruption (Ades & Di Tella,
1999; Gatti, 2004; Gokcekus & Kn€orich, 2006; Krueger, 1974; Serra, 2006). If a more
corrupt country engages in trade with a less corrupt country, the highly corrupt
country will be encouraged to reduce its level of corruption over time. For instance,
with trade domestic firms are subject to competition with their foreign counterparts.
This competition can force the domestic economy to reduce rent-seeking behaviour,
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and as a result lower the level of corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1999). On the other
hand, trade protection/restriction does not only reduce the volume of trade, it might
provide opportunities for collusive interactions between private agents (or importers)
and public (or customs) officials. This collusion can lead to payment and collection
of bribes (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Gatti, 2004; Krueger, 1974). Studies have found that
the level of openness is negatively and significantly related to corruption (see Ades &
Di Tella, 1997, 1999; Gokcekus & Kn€orich, 2006).
Based on the issues discussed above, the corruption model is specified as:
CORt ¼ a0 þ a1LGDPCt þ a2POLt þ a3LMLEt þ a4RENTt
þ a5CIVt þ a6OPENt þ lt (1)
where L denotes the logarithm of the variables. Time series data were used for the
period 1984-2016. The period was chosen due the availability of data particularly on
corruption. The data are measured as follow. COR is proxied by the Political Risk
Service International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index, GDPC is meas-
ured as real-GDP per capita, RENT is measured as mineral rents as a % of GDP,
MLE is measured as military expenditure, OPEN is measured as the sum of imports
and exports to GDP ratio, while POL and CIV were proxied by the Freedom House’s
political rights and civil liberties indexes, respectively. The data on the variables were
collected from various sources as follows. The data on military expenditure, GDP per
capita, imports and exports, GDP, and mineral rents were collected from the World
Development Indicators; political rights and civil liberties from the Freedom House,
and corruption from the ICRG.
4. Econometric techniques
4.1. Unit root test
Prior to the estimation of the relationship between corruption and its potential determi-
nants, a unit root test was conducted to establish the stationarity property of the variables.
Two tests were employed to perform the unit root test. They are the Augmented Dicker
Fuller (ADF) and Philips–Perron (PP). The unit root (stationarity) test results reported in
Table 2 illustrate that OPEN and CIV are stationary at level (i.e., they have no unit root).
Table 2. Results of unit root tests.
ADF PP
Variable Level First difference Level First difference
COR –1.9513 –2.7591 –1.4136 –2.6725
LGDPC –2.0036 –4.0572 –1.9554 –4.0442
POL –2.5187 –9.2254 –2.3295 –18.6006
LMLE –1.1635 –6.4868 –0.9502 –6.4225
RENT 1.4268 –4.8525 2.3342 –4.8523
OPEN –4.1420 –6.1504 –4.1420 –17.8096
CIV –3.4884 –4.3318 –2.1687 –6.1409
Asterisks ,  and  indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis of no unit root at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
L denotes logarithm.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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That is, the variables are I(0). On the other hand, COR, LGDPC, POL, LMLE and
RENT, are stationary only after taking their first difference. In essence, the series are I(1).
Therefore, the series/variables are a combination of I(0) and (1).
4.2. ARDL-bounds testing to cointegration
Given that the series are I(0) and I(1), the ARDL bounds testing method to cointegra-
tion (Pesaran & Shin, 1999; Pesaran, Shin, & Smith, 2001) was employed to check if
there is cointegration or long-run relationship between corruption and its determinants.
The ARDL method has several advantages over other cointegration techniques
including the residual-based technique (Engle & Granger, 1987) and the maximum
likelihood test (Johansen, 1988; 1991; Johansen & Juselius, 1990). These advantages
have been discussed in details (see Abu, 2017, 2019). First, the ARDL technique can
be used to investigate the existence of cointegration between variables whether the
order of integration is I(0), I(1), or a combination of both. Second, whereas the
residual-based technique such as the Johansen cointegration approach requires a large
sample for validity, the ARDL method is superior when investigating cointegration
using small samples. Third, the ARDL method permits the variables to have different
lags, but this is not often the case when using the conventional cointegration meth-
ods. Last, the ARDL method employs a single reduced-form equation to estimate the
short-run and long-run parameters of the model simultaneously, while the conven-
tional cointegration techniques use a system of equations.
The ARDL model is specified as follows:























a7iDOPENti þ d1CORt1 þ d2LGDPCt1 þ d3POLt1
þ d4LMLEt1 þ d5RENTt1 þ d6CIVt1 þ d7OPENt1 þ e1t (2)
The procedure of the ARDL approach starts with the conduct of bounds test for
the null hypothesis of no cointegration (H0) against the alternative hypothesis (H1)
for the individual equation stated as follows:
H0 ¼ d1 ¼ d2 ¼ d3 ¼ d4 ¼ d5 ¼ d6 ¼ d7 ¼ 0,
H1 6¼ d1 6¼ d2 6¼ d3 6¼ d4 6¼ d5 6¼ d6 6¼ d7 6¼ 0
In deciding whether there is cointegration between/among the series, the computed F-
statistic is compared with upper critical bounds value [I(1)] or lower critical bounds value
[I(0)]. If the computed F-statistic is greater than the [I(1)], we conclude that the series are
cointegrated. But if the computed F-statistic is smaller than the [I(0)], we conclude that
there is no cointegrating relationship between the series. In addition, if the F-statistic falls
between the [I(1)] and [I(0)], then our inference would be inconclusive.
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If it is established that a cointegrating or long-run relationship exists between the
variables, then the long-run coefficients can estimated using the long-run model that
is expressed as follows:
CORt ¼ b0 þ b1iCORti þ b2iLGDPCti þ b3iPOLti þ b4iLMLEti
þ b5iRENTti þ b6iCIVti þ b7iOPENti þ e1t (4)
Additionally, if it is confirmed that a long-run relationship exists between the vari-
ables, then the short-run coefficients can be estimated by using the error correction
model that is specified as follows:























b7iDOPENti þ /1ECTt1 þ e1t (5)
The ECT is the error correction variable. The coefficient of the ECT lagged by one
period, /, represents the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium in the long-run fol-
lowing a deviation from the equilibrium in the short-run.
4.3. Alternative estimation techniques (CCR and FMOLS)
In order to check the consistency and robustness of the results that are generated
using the ARDL, two other estimation techniques were employed. The methods are
the Canonical Cointegration Regression (CCR) of Park (1992) and the Fully Modified
Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) of Hansen and Phillips (1990).
The CCR and FMOLS like the ARDL method have certain advantages over the
conventional cointegration techniques (see Alhassan & Fiador, 2014; Montalvo, 1995;
Narayan & Narayan, 2004; Singh, 2015). For example, the CCR and FMOLS methods
solve problems of endogeneity bias and serial-correlation. In addition, both techni-
ques generate more efficient results in small samples compared to the conventional
cointegration methods.
The FMOLS, as a single cointegrating vector, is used to estimate long-run relation-
ships. The FMOLS modifies the least squares by taking into consideration the serial-
correlation and endogeneity effects in the regressors that emanate from the presence
of the cointegrating relationship. The procedure begins with the conventional OLS
estimation, and it makes a nonparametric correction that accounts for the endogene-
ity and serial-correlation that might arise in the OLS residuals (Singh, 2015). The
CCR method implements the OLS estimation by transforming variables using the
long-run covariance matrix of the error terms so that the OLS estimator is asymptot-
ically efficient (Beard, Jackson, Kaserman, & Kim, 2010). The CCR and FMOLS esti-
mations were performed using Bartlett Kernel with Newey-West fixed bandwidth.
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5. Results and discussion
5.1. Results of bounds testing to cointegration
The results of the bound testing to cointegration in Table 3 reveal that the F-statistic
(18.4932) is larger than the [I(1)].
This finding implies that the variables are cointegrated. Thus, there is a long-run
relationship between corruption and its determinants.
5.2. Results of selected long-run and short-run models
In estimating the ARDL model the optimal lag-length (2,2,1,2,2,2,2) was suggested by
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The results of the selected long-run and
short-run models are shown in Table 4.
The results demonstrate that economic development has a positive and significant
effect on the corruption index at 1%, in the long-run. A 1% increase in economic
Table 3. Results of bounds tests to cointegration.
Dependent Variable Function F-Statistic
COR F(COR/LGDPC,POL,LMLE,RENT, OPEN, CIV) 18.4932
Critical Values Bounds
10% 5% 2.5% 1%
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
1.99 2.94 2.27 3.28 2.55 3.61 2.88 3.99
Denotes statistical significance at 1% level.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Table 4. Results of ARDL model.
Panel A: Long-run Coefficients - Dependent variable is COR
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio Prob.
C –39.7409 9.1996 –4.3198 0.0025
LGDPC 2.5255 0.5703 4.4283 0.0022
POL –0.0922 0.0382 –2.4122 0.0424
LMLE 0.3976 0.0877 4.5335 0.0019
RENT –24.3326 4.9896 –4.8754 0.0012
CIV 0.0846 0.0484 1.7463 0.1189
OPEN 3.2554 0.9751 3.3385 0.0103
Panel B: Short-run Coefficients - Dependent variable is DCOR
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio Prob.
DCOR–1 0.6113 0.0571 10.7022 0.0000
DLGDPC 1.4052 0.1344 10.4543 0.0000
DLGDPC–1 –1.7891 0.1895 –9.4391 0.0000
DPOL –0.0469 0.0107 –4.3811 0.0023
DLMLE –0.2727 0.0323 –8.4383 0.0000
DLMLE–1 –0.3110 0.0329 –9.4277 0.0000
DRENT –2.9383 1.2609 –2.3301 0.0481
DRENT–1 15.860 1.8408 8.6158 0.0000
DCIV 0.0883 0.0121 7.2901 0.0001
DCIV–1 0.0708 0.0134 5.2787 0.0007
DOPEN 0.3832 0.1335 2.8692 0.0209
DOPEN–1 –1.2499 0.1373 –9.0986 0.0000
ECM–1 –0.8141 0.0488 –16.6553 0.0000
R2 0.9725
D is the first difference operator. L denotes logarithm.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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development leads to an improvement in the corruption index (a reduction in cor-
ruption) by 2.53 point. Similarly, economic development has a positive and significant
effect on the corruption index at 1%, in the short-run. A 1% increase in economic
development leads to an increase in the corruption index (a reduction in corruption)
by 1.41 point. This finding is consistent with the outcomes of prior studies (see Busse
& Gr€oning, 2013; Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012; Goel & Nelson, 2010; Knack & Azfar,
2003; Kolstad & Wiig, 2015; Kotera et al., 2012; Lederman et al., 2005; Montinola &
Jackman, 2002; Serra, 2006; Triesman, 2000, 2007).
The results also illustrate that political rights has a negative and significant effect
on the corruption index at 5%, in the long-run. An increase in political rights by 1
index point leads to a deterioration in the corruption index (an increase in corrup-
tion) by 0.09 point. In the same vein, political rights do have a negative and signifi-
cant effect on the corruption index at 1%, in the short-run. An increase in political
rights by 1 index point leads to a deterioration in the corruption index (an increase
in corruption) by 0.05 point. This finding suggests that greater political rights do not
to reduce corruption. Past studies indicated that political rights have no significant
relationship with the level of corruption (see Ades & Di Tella, 1997). In the same
vein, Ades and Di Tella (1999) submitted that the lack of political rights appears to
be related to lower corruption. Furthermore, Serra (2006) reported a very weak rela-
tionship between political rights and corruption. Moreover, Triesman (2007) argued
that democracy might encourage corruption is the short-term as the depth of democ-
racy increases.
Military expenditure has a positive and significant effect on the corruption index
at 1%, in the long-run. A 1% increase in military expenditure leads to an improve-
ment in the corruption index (a reduction in corruption) by 0.40 point. But military
expenditure has a negative and significant effect on the corruption index at 1%, in
the short-run. A 1% increase in military expenditure leads to a deterioration in the
corruption index (an increase in corruption) by 0.27 point. This finding is in line
with the claim that rent-seeking in the military sector encourage corrupt acts (see
d’Agostino et al., 2012).
Rents has a negative and significant effect on the corruption index at 1%, in the
long-run. A 1% increase in mineral rents leads to a deterioration in the corruption
index (an increase in corruption) by 24.33 point. Similarly, rents has a negative and
significant effect on the corruption index at 5%, in the short-run. A 1% increase in
mineral rents leads to a deterioration in the corruption index (an increase in corrup-
tion) by 2.94 point. This finding is consistent with the outcome of prior research (see
Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Arezki & Bruckner, 2011; Triesman, 2007).
Openness has a positive and significant effect on the corruption index at 5%, in
the long-run. A 1% increase in openness leads to an improvement in the corrup-
tion index (a reduction in corruption) by 3.26 point. Also, openness has a positive
and significant effect on the corruption index at 5%, in the shortrun. A 1%
increase in openness leads to an improvement in the corruption index (a reduc-
tion in corruption) by 0.38 point. This outcome support the ones discovered in
previous studies (see Ades & Di Tella, 1997, 1999; Gokcekus & Kn€orich, 2006;
Triesman, 2007).
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Civil liberties has a positive and significant effect on the corruption index at 1%,
in the short-run. An increase in civil liberties by 1 index point leads to an improve-
ment in the corruption index (a reduction in corruption) by 0.09 point. This finding
is consistent with the outcome of prior studies (see Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012).
Thus, greater freedom of expression will reduce corruption.
The coefficient of the error correction term lagged by one period [ECM-1] is
–0.9725 and statistically significant at 1%. This illustrates that 97.25% of the devia-
tions from equilibrium is corrected within a year.
The positive association between economic development and low level of cor-
ruption suggests that, at high level of income Nigeria can commit huge financial
resources to tackle corruption. In addition, proper funding of anti-corruption
agencies such as the EFCC and ICPC will strengthen and aid them in their detec-
tion of corrupt acts, including investigation and prosecution of offenders.
Moreover, at high-income level income inequality is less and people are more edu-
cated. The equitable distribution in income implies that individuals can meet their
basic needs, and the tendency to engage in corrupt acts will be less. Besides, edu-
cation promotes awareness and encourages citizens to know their rights and
duties. These discourage them from engaging in corrupt practices, as well as
encouraging them to participate in any activities that will lead to exposing corrupt
individuals.
The negative association between political rights index and corruption index sug-
gests that at higher political rights corruption gets worsen. After many years of mili-
tary dictatorship, Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999 and there has been a
gradual improvement in political rights. In addition, electorates are gradually having
their say during political processes and electioneering periods in terms of the right to
vote and be voted for. In addition, some elected officials/political office holders have
lost their office or failed in their bid to be re-elected on account of poor performance
in the office. For instance, the former ruling party (PDP) was voted out office after
sixteen (16) years, that is, 1999–2015, on account of poor economic performance, ris-
ing insecurity and corruption. However, corruption still persists and remains high
particularly in the public sector. There are allegations of corruption, lack of account-
ability and transparency in the dealings of the state-owned oil firm, Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Also, many state Governors owe salaries
(to their employees) for several months even though the Federal Government has
given bail-outs to states to ensure regular payment of workers’ salaries. Recently, the
Transparency International reported that corruption is high in Nigeria. In essence,
despite the improvement in political rights, corruption remains a serious issue
in Nigeria.
The positive relationship between greater civil liberties and lower corruption dem-
onstrates that greater freedom of expression, rights to association and organisation,
and entrenchment of rule of law will lower corruption in Nigeria. The emergency of
groups such as human rights activists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
demanding transparency and accountability, including investigation of allegations of
corruption against certain government agencies and political office holders might
reduce the tendency of government officials to engage in corruption.
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The positive linkage between openness and lower corruption level suggests that
increases in openness to foreign trade with other countries will expose domestic firms
to competition with their foreign counterparts. Moreover, more openness to trade
(lesser protection) will reduce the tendency for collusive behaviour between importers
and customs officials, leading to a reduction in the payment and collection of bribes,
and as a result lowering corruption level.
The negative connection between high rents and worsening corruption indicates
that Nigeria’s dependence on natural resources or minerals such as oil and fuels as
major revenue sources, encourages rent-seeking behaviour between foreign oil firms
operating in Nigeria, the NNPC and top government officials. One major issue that
has always been discussed in Nigeria is the lack of transparency and accountability in
the dealings and operations of the NNPC.
The short-run negative relationship between military expenditure and rising cor-
ruption demonstrates that the monopolistic nature (lack of competition) of the mili-
tary or defence sector will promote secrecy in contracts awards and approvals. The
absence of private sector involvement promotes rent-seeking and corruption. The trial
of former NSA and certain senior military officers who served in the last govern-
ment/administration shows the extent of corruption in Nigeria military. On the other
hand, the long-run positive association between military expenditure and improve-
ment in the corruption index (lower corruption) suggests that high military spending
reduces corruption in Nigeria in the long-run. Thus, given the commitment of the
government and anti-graft agencies in the fight against corruption with respect to the
military sector, corruption can be brought under control in the future. Therefore,
when offenders are arrested and punished, it will deter military personnel from
engaging in corrupt practices.
5.3. Results of diagnostic tests
The diagnostic tests results reported in Table 5 show that the LM test statistic and
corresponding probability value for serial-correlation, normality, and heteroscedastic-
ity are 4.8476(0.0559), 0.7738(0.6791), and 3.0977(0.0529), respectively.
These findings indicate that the ARDL model does not have serial-correlation and
heteroscedasticity problems, including passing the normality test at 5%.
Furthermore, the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and cumulative
sum of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMQ) tests were conducted to ascertain
the stability of the parameters over the studied period. If the plots of CUSUMQ
breaks in the lower or upper bounds, instability of the parameters will be said to
have occurred (Greene, 2003; Tang & Lean, 2007). The plots in Figures 1 and 2 are
shown to fall within the boundaries.
Table 5. ARDL diagnostic tests.
LM Test Statistic Results
Serial Correlation: v2 4.8476 [0.0559]
Normality (Jarque-Bera) 0.7738 [0.6791]
Heteroscedasticity: v2 3.0977 [0.0529]
Probability values are in brackets.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Thus, the results of the stability test confirm that the long-run parameters
are stable.
5.4. Results of alternative estimation techniques
The results of CCR and FMOLS estimations (Table 6) are similar to the ones gener-
ated from the ARDL model (except for the openness variable). Both CCR (Panel C)
Figure 1. Cumulative sum of recursive residuals plots. Source: Authors’ calculation.
Figure 2. Cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals plots. Source: Authors’ calculation.
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and FMOLS (Panel D) results demonstrate that higher economic development,
increases in military expenditure and greater civil liberties are associated with less
corruption, while rents and political rights tend to worsen corruption in Nigeria, in
the long-run.
Overall, the results of the ARDL, CCR and FMOLS estimations are similar in
many respects, and thus increase our confidence that the estimates generated are con-
sistent and robust.
6. Conclusion
This study examines the determinants of corruption in Nigeria, from 1984 to 2016.
Using the bounds testing method to cointegration, the results show that there is a
long-run relationship between corruption and its determinants (economic development,
political rights and civil liberties, military expenditure, rents, and openness). The results
of the ARDL, CCR and FMOLS estimation illustrate the main determinants of corrup-
tion in Nigeria in the long-run to include economic development, political rights civil
liberties, military expenditure, rents and openness. Greater economic development,
more civil liberties and openness, as well as increases in military expenditure reduce
corruption, while increases in rents and greater political rights encourage corruption in
the long-run. Furthermore, economic development, civil liberties and openness have a
reducing impact on corruption, while political rights, military expenditure, and oil rents
encourage corruption in Nigeria in the short-run. Based on these findings, this study
recommends policies that will promote economic development, civil liberties and open-
ness, including reducing the reliance on the oil sector to curb corruption in Nigeria.
In particular, government and policymakers should employ policies to promote
economic development so as to reduce corruption. This can be achieved via increased
investment in public works and infrastructure. In addition, efforts should be made to
Table 6. Results of FMOLS and CCR models.
Panel C: FMOLS - Dependent variable is COR
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio Prob.
C –46.597 7.9388 –5.8696 0.0000
LGDPC 3.0426 0.4849 6.2741 0.0000
POL –0.1286 0.0526 –2.4420 0.0231
LMLE 0.4475 0.0802 5.5767 0.0000
RENT –17.641 4.8194 –3.6604 0.0014
CIV 0.1252 0.0582 2.1516 0.0427
OPEN 0.7483 0.6994 1.0698 0.2963
R2 0.8083
Panel D: CCR - Dependent variable is COR
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio Prob.
C –48.923 10.567 –4.6297 0.0001
LGDPC 3.1703 0.6398 4.9545 0.0001
POL –0.1230 0.0640 –1.9202 0.0679
LMLE 0.4706 0.1067 4.4070 0.0002
RENT –19.545 6.3834 –3.0619 0.0057
CIV 0.1414 0.0705 2.0066 0.0572
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boost (and sustain growth of) domestic production of goods and services. These will
lead to employment creation as well as raising income generating opportunities, and
as a result lower corruption.
Second, government should promote civil liberties and freedom of speech. This
will encourage the citizens to not only demand for accountability and transparency,
but also to expose corrupt government officials. In addition, although political rights
appear not to lower corruption in the long-run, authorities should promote political
rights. Greater political rights will promote political competition, and encourage citi-
zens to vote and/or be voted for. In addition, electorate can punish corrupt officials
via voting them out of office or making sure they are not re-elected.
Third, while one will expect that a policy of reducing military expenditure is
required to curb corruption, the ongoing security challenges and attacks on many
communities by insurgents, including kidnapping and cattle rustling, among other
things, demand an increase in military spending in Nigeria. Proper funding of the
military will help to restore peace in Nigeria. Relative peace will promote economic
activities and raise income over the long term. As stated earlier, when people earn
high income they will be reluctant to engage in corrupt acts. In addition, government
should ensure that due process is followed during contracts bidding, approvals and
awards with respect to military purchases.
Fourth, efforts should be geared towards diversifying the economy to reduce
Nigeria’s reliance on the oil sector as a major revenue earner to the government. In
addition, the state-owned oil corporation (NNPC) should be encouraged to embrace
transparency and accountability in its entire operations. This will results in a reduc-
tion in rent-seeking behaviour and corrupt practices which have become a common
feature of the oil sector in Nigeria.
Last, government should take steps to open up the economy more and expose
domestic firms to foreign competition. Greater competition in turn will reduce rent-
seeking behaviour and corruption.
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